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A REVIEW OF HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND COMPETITION 
IN THE U.S. AlRLINE INDUSTRY 
Gerald N. Cook 
The airline industry has evolved~in two profoundly different eras, first under the protective hand of federal 
economic regulation and, following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, subjected to the full force of the 
free market. This history has proved a fertile testing ground for economic theories and predictions of market 
behavior. This paper first provides a brief history of the domestic airline industry under regulation. Next, the 
post-deregulation transformation is reviewed. Attention is then focused on a survey of the extensive airline 
economic literature. Finally, several current trends that promise to further shape the industry are examined. 
REGULATORY HISTORY 
Birth of the Airline Industry 
The U.S. airline industry was born and reared in a 
time of regulation and subsidy. In 1918, the Post Office 
began administering airmail routes operated by U.S. 
Army pilots and aircraft. A rudimentary transcontinental 
infrastructure of navigational lights and airfields 
developed to support the nascent airmail service. In 1925, 
Congress passed the Contract Air Mail Act, popularly 
known as the Kelly Act after its principal congressional 
sponsor, authorizing the Post Office to award routes and 
payments to private air carriers. Over the following 
decade, cost overruns, inefficiencies, and political scandal 
led to frequent and somewhat chaotic changes in the 
system of route awards and subsidies, even including a 
brief and disastrous return to all-Army service in 1934. 
Despite the turbulence of the period, the "Big Fourw 
airlines, United, American, Trans World, and Eastern, 
trace their origins to this time (Bailey, Graham, & 
Kaplan, 1985; Heppenheimer, 1995; Meyer & Oster, 
1981; Petzinger, 1995). Although the others survive, 
Eastern eventually liquidated following industry 
deregulation. 
Limited aircraft performance and spartan 
accommodations doomed most early attempts at 
passenger service offered in conjunction with airmail 
delivery. Introduction of new twin-engine airplanes, most 
notably the Douglas DC-2 and later the ubiquitous DC-3, 
enabled the fledgling airlines to offer reliable passenger 
service with an acceptable level of comfort. With the 
growth of passenger service, airline regulation was 
transferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) in 1935. The ICC's governance, however, proved 
unenlightened and disruptive as a revised policy caused 
many carriers to bid below cost for new route awards, 
debilitating the industry (Button, 1991). 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 transferred 
regulatory authority over air commerce to the Civil 
Aviation Authority, reorganized two years later as the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). In part a reaction to the 
Great Depression, the 1938 Act directed the CAB to 
enact policies to promote and develop an economical, 
safe, and efficient air transportation system free of "unfair 
or destructive competitive practices" (Meyer & Oster, 
1981, p. 18). This mandate provided the basis for CAB 
regulatory actions over the next 40 years. Though 
certainly successful and probably necessary for the early 
development of the airline industry and the air 
transportation infrastructure, the CAB'S aversion to 
competition eventually led to its demise. 
Four Decades of Regulation under the CAB 
World War I1 supported a period of sustained 
profitability as much of the airline fleet was diverted to 
military transport. At the war's end, hundreds of surplus 
DC-3's and DC-4's entered airline service. New non- 
scheduled airlines, followed shortly by the trunk carriers, 
introduced high-density seating and coach fares, 
foreshadowing the development of today's complex 
discount fare system. Low fares spurred demand; traffic 
doubled over a five-year period (Heppenheimer, 1995). 
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Also with the conclusion of the war, the CAB 
responded to political pressure for more local air service 
by awarding certificates and routes to newly founded local 
service airlines (LSA). These carriers were to provide 
connections from smaller cities to those destinations 
served by the trunk carriers. The CAB was careful to 
prevent the LSA's from competing directly with lhe 
trunks, generally requiring an intermediate stop on any 
route connecting cities already served by established 
carriers (Button, 1991). 
During the 1950's and 1%0's, subsidization of most 
local service and many trunk routes continued. Local 
subsidy cost, exacerbated by fares deliberately set below 
marginal cost in accordance with the CAB formula, 
escalated rapidly as the LSA's added routes and replaced 
their original DC-3 aircraft with larger equipment. In an 
effort to reduce subsidy costs, the CAB at first shifted 
some low-density trunk routes to the LSA's. When this 
approach failed, longer and potentially more profitable 
routes, often in direct competition with the trunk 
carriers, were awarded (Bailey, Graham, & Kaplan, 1985). 
Despite this overlap of local service and trunk carrier 
routes, the CAB largely maintained its vision of a bi-level 
industry. Trunk airlines served long-distance routes 
between major cities and local-service carriers provided 
connecting service from smaller cities to trunk 
destinations. Consequently, many itineraries required a 
change of airlines. Because of poorly coordinated flight 
schedules, significant delays awaiting a connecting flight 
were common. 
Despite these problems, the industry grew rapidly, 
enjoying more than a tenfold growth in passengers 
between 1950 and 1970. Technological advances first 
embodied in the long-range DC-6 and Constellation 
aircraft and then in the first-generation commercial jet 
transports provided steady improvements in productivity. 
Airfares, though high, remained nominally stable but 
declined in real terms throughout the period (Bailey, 
Graham, & Kaplan, 1985). High fares, however, limited 
air travel to business and affluent passengers (Petzinger, 
1995). 
Calls for Change 
The impetus for regulatory change first appeared in 
the early 1970's. Prohibited from competing on fares and 
routes, carriers responded by increasing flight frequency, 
lowering seating density, and adding ever more 
extravagant in-flight senice. Anticipating continued rapid 
traffic growth that accompanied the introduction of jet 
aircraft, the major carriers placed new wide-body aircraft 
in senice, exacerbating existing overcapacity. Load factors 
fell from 70 percent in 1950 to 50 percent by 1970. With 
the transition to jet aircraft complete, productivity gains 
that had cushioned the economic consequences of falling 
load factors slowed. The industry's financial health 
weakened. 
The CAB responded to the deteriorating financial 
conditions by increasing its regulatory interventions. In 
addition to the ongoing denial of new carrier 
applications, it imposed a new route moratorium on 
existing carriers, approved a 20 percent fare increase in 
1974, and sanctioned capacity limitation agreements 
among the major carriers (Borenstein, 1992, Button, 
1991). These actions raised alarm outside the CAB, 
resulting in a consensus in government and academia that 
regulato~y distortions imposed unacceptable burdens on 
the economy and society (Levine, 1987). 
Sensing a winning issue, Senator Edward Kennedy 
held congressional hearings in 1975 sharply critical of 
CAB policies. Studies comparing intrastate airlines 
operating outside CAB control with the trunk carriers 
projected fares 50 percent to 70 percent lower if the 
industry was deregulated. 
Deregulation Act 
In response to the criticism, the CAB reversed its 
policies, beginning with the approval of new route 
applications. In 1977, it consented to American Airlines' 
request for Super Saver discounts some 45 percent below 
existing coach fares. When American's traffic swelled as 
much as 60 percent in response, the solution to 
overcapacity seemed at hand. Other carriers quickly filed 
and received CAB approval for similar discounts. De 
facto deregulation was under way (Meyer & Oster, 1981). 
In 1978, now with the active encouragement of new 
CAB Chairman Alfred Kahn, Congress passed the Airline 
Deregulation Act (ADA). It mandated that the CAB 
phase out its route approval authority over three years, 
the regulation of fares over five, and pass its remaining 
functions to the Department of Transportation. The CAB 
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ceased operation at the end of 1984 (Bailey, Graham, & 
Kaplan, 1985). 
POST-DEREGULATION EVOLUTION 
Proponents of deregulation unanimously predicted 
improved consumer welfare with the elimination of price 
and entry control. Regulation, it was argued, caused 
carriers to resort to non-price competition, which led 
directly to the overcapacity and low-load factors of the 
1970's. Less agreement existed on the likely effect of 
deregulation on industry structure. Asserting that the 
industry benefits from little or no returns to scale, some 
observers felt equilibrium would lead to many new 
carriers. Conversely, others contended that without 
regulatory restraint large carriers would crush any daring 
new entrants with an attendant growth in concentration 
(Borenstein, 1992, Gaynor & Trapani, 1994). Within the 
industry, most feared that the subsequent upheaval, 
though unpredictable, would prove extremely painful. 
History offers some support for all positions. 
Growth and Consolidation 
The years immediately following deregulation were 
marked by rapid expansion of existing carriers, including 
entry into former trunk routes by local service and intra- 
state airlines. New-entrant carriers proliferated. Bates 
(19%) lists 24 jet carriers that started flying between the 
passage of the ADA and 1985, People Express being 
perhaps the best known. Most provided basic air 
transportation but, in confirmation of the deregulation 
proponents, offered bargain fares as well. 
The difficulties of the early 1980's, however, 
including intense competition, the oil embargo, the air 
traffic controllers' strike, and recession, reversed the 
trend. By 1988, consolidation, acquisition, and bankruptcy 
reduced the 24 early postderegulation airlines to just 
two, Midwest Express and America West. Nor were 
major carriers exempted from the turmoil as Braniff, 
Eastern, and fabled Pan American World Airways 
succumbed in bankruptcy. 
By the end of the decade, the percent of traffic 
carried by the largest airlines returned to pre-ADA levels. 
The eight biggest carriers accounted for 78 percent of the 
total traffic in both 1978 and 1988. System expansion, 
however, boosted the number of routes each carrier 
served from approximately 200 to nearly 500 so that 
route level concentration actually declined. In a 
continuation of past trends, traffic more than doubled 
(Borenstein, 1992, Button, 1991; Evans & Kessides, 
1993b). 
Structural and Marketing Changes 
Many aspects of the industry transformation caught 
observers by surprise. The deregulation debate focused on 
fare levels. Proponents pointed to intrastate carriers PSA 
and Southwest as exemplar airlines combining a simple 
fare structure with low peak and off-peak pricing and a 
linear route system. The result is vastly different. Alfred 
Kahn (1988), Michael Levine (1987), and others list 
several "surprising" outcomes. Among these are: (a) the 
dominance of hub-and-spoke route systems resulting from 
internal growth, merger, and vertical integration; (b) the 
pervasive role of computer reservations systems (CRS's); 
(c) an exceedingly complex fare structure controlled by 
sophisticated yield management software; (d) rebate 
programs of frequent flier awards and travel agency 
override commissions; and (e) the persistence of 
predation and high casualty rate among new airline 
entrants. These developments led Levine to conclude that 
large carriers exercise a degree of market power which, 
despite relative ease of entry, new carriers cannot 
overcome. 
Hub-and-Spoke Systems 
Largely unanticipated in the deregulation debate but 
arguably the most important change is the development 
of the hub-and-spoke route system (Bailey, Graham, & 
Kaplan, 1985; Kahn, 1988, Levine, 1987). This design 
routes flights from the origin to a major intermediate 
"hub" city where passengers change planes for a 
continuing flight to their destination. Because of the 
large number of city pairs connected through the hub, 
even smaller cities generate enough traffic to warrant 
frequent flights with jet aircraft. Economies arise because 
higher traffic density allows the use of more efficient 
aircraft at higher load factors (Brueckner, Dyer, & 
Spiller, l m ,  Caves, Christensen, & Tretheway, 1984). At 
the other extreme of route structure design, cities are 
linked in serial fashion, a common structure under CAB 
regulation. But with this structure, only large city pairs 
generate sufficient traffic to justify jet service. 
Freed from restrictions on mergerlacquisition and 
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routeexpansion following the passage of the ADA, major 
carriers moved quickly to develop extensive hub-spoke 
networks. In addition to internal expansion, route systems 
grew through acquisition of former local senice carriers. 
Northwest merged with Republic, TWA merged with 
Ozark, Delta acquired Western, American acquired Air 
California, USAir acquired PSA and merged with 
Piedmont, and Continental grew with the additions of 
Frontier and People Express. To serve smaller cities near 
the hub, airlines either acquired or entered into 
marketing agreements with commuter airlines principally 
operating turbopropeller aircraft. These agreements 
typically involve code-sharing in which the commuter 
flights are listed under the major carrier's designation in 
the CRS's, frequently leaving passengers unaware of the 
change in level of service. The American Airlines' Eagle 
network is the largest example. 
Every major airline with the exception of Southwest 
relies on a hub-and-spoke system of one or more hub 
cities. Although carriers concentrate in specific 
geographical areas, the hub system allows the largest 
carriers to compete in nearly every major U.S. market. 
Each airline attempts to capture the passenger from 
origin to destination. Dominance at hub airports has 
allowed some carriers to exercise significant control over 
gates and other airport facilities, a power which is 
occasionally used to restrict access by new entrants 
(Levine, 1987). 
Computer Reservations Systems 
The requirement to store, retrieve, and process data 
on thousands of daily flights, many more connections, 
and hundred of thousands of passengers lends itself 
naturally to the computer application. Airlines were 
among the first to employ the technology (Petzinger, 
1995). Perhaps less obvious were the marketing 
advantages of leasing these computer reservations systems 
to travel agents. The four major CRS's, each owned by a 
single or small consortium of airlines, list virtually all 
commercial flights, allowing an individual travel agent to 
use just one system. American's Sabre CRS has the 
highest penetration; however, the geographically 
predominant carrier generally captures most of the local 
agency market (Levine, 1987). Booking charges for 
reservations made on the systems for competitors' flights 
provide additional ownership returns. 
From the start, reservation systems stirred 
controversy. Early flight displays were highly biased in 
favor of the owner airline, listing its flights first. 
American's egregious use of this marketing tactic brought 
protests by other carriers and eventual regulatory 
restriction on display bias (Petzinger, 1995). As a 
byproduct of the CRS, all carriers gain instant access to 
competitors' continually changing fares. Allegations that 
the system provided a means of signaling proposed fare 
changes and subtle collusion prompted regulations 
restricting advance notice of pricing changes. 
Complex Fares 
Travel demand varies by time of day, day of the 
week, and season. If sufficient capacity exists to meet 
peak demand, then seats will go unsold on off-peak 
flights. Discount fares can smooth traffic patterns by 
shifting less time-sensitive passengers to off-peak flights 
and inducing price-sensitive consumers to travel. To 
avoid diluting all fares, however, advance purchase, 
Saturday stay, and other restrictions on discount fares 
attempt to segregate passengers by willingness to pay. 
Though some cost justification exists for these different 
fare levels, classic price discrimination motivates most of 
the fare dispersion (Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Oum, 
Zhang, & Zhang, 1 m ) .  
American's original Super Saver discount fare and 
its competitors' imitations have grown over the last two 
decades into a bewilderingly complex array of discount 
fares. To extract the maximum revenue potential, yield 
management software controls the availability of fare 
levels for each flight on a real-time basis. Beginning with 
historical booking data, the yield management software 
continuously monitors the booking progress of each flight 
as the departure date approaches, adjusting the 
availability of discount fares in an attempt to maximize 
revenue (Weatherford & Bodily, I=). As ability to 
manage fares and discriminate among passengers on 
willingness to pay improved, airline marketers widened 
the spread between high and low fares much to the 
consternation and disadvantage of business travelers who 
typically pay the highest prices (Evans & Kessides, 
1993b). 
The use and sophistication of yield management 
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software varies considerably among carriers. The latest 
advances attempt to maximize revenue across the airline's 
entire route network rather than by flight segment as 
earlier versions have done. TWA, in contrast, only 
recently installed its first system. Borenstein and Rose 
(1994) provide some empirical evidence that airlines with 
the best systems extract higher yields. 
Rebates 
Airlines employ a somewhat less sophisticated 
device, indelicately but accurately termed kickbacks, to 
instill brand loyalty. Frequent flier programs (FFP) 
provide rewards, generally free travel, to passengers based 
on  a scale of miles flown. Travel agency override 
commissions (TACO) represent the travel agency analog 
to FFP. Agencies typically receive a higher commission 
on  sales above a set monthly minimum. The CRS's 
provide reliable sales data necessary to administer these 
override commissions. 
Predation 
As Levine (1987), the one-time president of People 
Express, points out, the evolution of structure and pricing 
methods leads to economies of scope and density 
benefiting the largest carriers (scope refers to the extent 
of the route system while density is the level of traffic 
generated on the system). American's Super Saver fares 
were, in part, a response to low-fare charter operators 
who diverted leisure travelers from American and other 
scheduled camers (Bailey, Graham, & Kaplan, 1985). 
Later, discount fares administered by yield management 
systems allowed the largest carriers to better the fares of 
low-cost, post-deregulation new entrants while 
simultaneously charging much higher prices to less price- 
sensitive passengers (Evans & Kessides, 1993b). Carriers 
with extensive hub-and-spoke systems can aggressively 
meet the competitive threat of new entrants in limited 
markets before they establish a defensible route system. 
FFP and TACO both benefit the predominant 
carrier in a geographical market. Each draws its power by 
exploiting principal-agent effects that arise when the 
agent encounters incentives in conflict with the best 
interests of the purchaser. Business travelers, the primary 
beneficiaries of the FFP, tend to choose the airline with 
the most extensive service in order to enhance their 
frequent flier awards even if this choice is not the most 
cost-effective travel option (Nako, 1992). Similarly, travel 
agents will book most flights on the largest carrier in 
their area to profit from override commissions. Booking 
on another carrier disproportionately decreases override 
commissions because the reward system is non-linear. If 
the fare on a competitor is less, generally the 
circumstance if the competitor is a new entrant, the agent 
also earns a smaller regular commission. To compete, 
new entrant and smaller carriers often find they must 
offer a higher percentage commission than larger carriers. 
Other marketing advantages also accrue to carriers with 
concentration in a market. Large carriers spread 
advertising costs over more product. Including many 
destinations in a newspaper ad, for example, is no more 
costly than advertising a few (Borenstein, 1991). 
Many casualties of deregulation were certainly 
victims of their own mismanagement (Bailey, 1992). 
Nonetheless, the low operating costs of new entrants 
have generally proved inadequate weapons to breach the 
barriers of establishing initial customer recognition and 
acceptance compounded by the competitive advantages of 
scope and density enjoyed by large incumbents. 
Economic Research 
The airline industry has long been the subject of 
concerted economic research. During the decades of CAB 
regulation, Board economists attempted to devise and 
implement policies to control the industry in the public 
interest, a pursuit that required extensive market data. 
The Board consequently required all airlines to provide 
standardized data on costs and traffic. Following 
deregulation, economists were presented with a rare 
opportunity to study the transition from strict regulatory 
control of product and pricing to relatively unimpeded 
competition. For the purpose of review, the literature is 
divided into studies of (a) effects on consumer welfare, 
(b) evidence of contestability, and (c) concentration and 
market power. 
Consumer Welfare 
Widespread consensus exists that deregulation has 
improved consumer welfare. The difficulty in estimating 
the actual gains stems first from determining the level of 
service and fares that would have existed had regulation 
continued (lack of a control group) and, second, from 
measuring simultaneous changes in price and quality 
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(Gaynor & Trapani, 1994). 
Economists believed consumers would primarily 
benefit from lower airfares with estimates ranging from 
2.7 to 6.6 billion dollars annually. Airfares have dropped 
dramatically but, as noted earlier, are far more complex 
and discriminatory than predicted. Business travelers have 
generally been excluded from otherwise available 
discounts. In his survey of economic deregulation 
predictions and results, Winston (1993) estimates the 
consumer gains from lower prices at $6.5 billion but 
deducts $3.0 billion for attendant fare restrictions leaving 
a net of $3.5 billion annually (in 1990 dollars). 
Though complaints about the deterioration in the 
quality of air travel are common, the development of hub 
and spoke networks greatly multiplied the frequency of 
available flights in most markets. Although leisure 
travelers have been the primary beneficiaries of airfare 
discounts, higher frequency serves the business traveler. 
Adjusting for some gain in travel time through the hub, 
Winston (1993) places the net gain at $7.5 billion. 
Consumer welfare gains from reduced fares and 
augmented service total some $1 1 billion annually. 
Contestability 
Proponents argued that a deregulated airline market 
would somehow approximate the ideal of perfect 
competition. A perfectly competitive market is 
characterized by (a) a large number of firms, the output 
of any one of which is too small to effect price; (b) 
homogeneous product; (c) costless price information; and 
(d) unimpeded entry and exit. Although most airline 
markets naturally support only a small number of 
competitors and differ markedly from the next two 
requirements as well, faith was placed in the supposed 
ease of entry and exit to discipline the market. Airline 
assets, it was argued, are highly mobile and few costs are 
sunk in entering and exiting a market. Therefore, high 
prices (economic rents) in a market encourage new 
entrant competition (Bailey & Baumol, 1984; Borenstein, 
1992). 
The Theory of Contestable Markets, formalized in 
1982, sets forth the conditions under which natural 
monopolies would approach the efficient pricing and 
asset allocation conditions of perfect competition. The 
theory requires the availability of potential entrants, 
freedom of entry, and costless exit so that any entry costs 
can be recovered. Under these conditions, the threat of 
entry disciplines the pricing of incumbent carriers (Bailey 
& Baumol, 1984). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence on the 
efficacy of contestability is poor. Aircraft mobility does 
not translate to free and costless entry and exit. 
Acquiring facilities and support equipment, hiring or 
transferring personnel, advertising new service, and, most 
importantly, building traffic in a new market requires 
time and money. When an incumbent can immediately 
adjust fares to meet new competition, there is little 
incentive to respond in advance. Several studies have 
shown that only actual competition significantly lowers 
prices (Bailey, Graham, & Kaplan, 1985; Borenstein, 
1989, 1990, 1992; Evans & Kessides, 1993b; Joesch & 
Zick, 1994; Whinston & Collins, 1992). Although 
estimates vary widely among studies, Borenstein (1992) 
estimates prices in 1990 on routes with two competitors 
averaged 8 percent less than monopoly routes; a third 
competitor produced another 8 percent drop. 
Concentration and Market Power 
As a consequence of the growth of the hub-and- 
spoke networks, the airline maintaining a hub provides 
the most service and carries the highest percentage of 
local traffic (Borenstein, 1991). Many studies confirm this 
concentration confers a degree of market power that 
raises local fares at the hub by as much as 20 percent. 
Much of this premium results from higher fares paid by 
business passengers traveling on the hub carrier (Berry, 
1990, Borenstein, 1989, 1990, Evans & Kessides, 1993a; 
Peteraf & Reed, 1994). Reasons for this seemingly anti- 
competitive behavior have been debated. Critics conclude 
that dominant carriers at individual hub airports exercise 
market power through their CRS's, FFP, TACO'S, and 
control of airport facilities that blocks entry or  expansion 
of rivals. Other contend that passengers willingly pay a 
premium for the frequency and quality of service a 
dominant hub carrier provides (Berry, 1990). 
The results of two controversial airline mergers that 
concluded in 1986 -- Northwest's merger with Republic 
and TWA's purchase of Ozark -- provided ideal tests of 
market power. Both mergers significantly increased hub 
airport concentrations and reduced competition on routes 
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where the consolidated carriers once competed. Fares at 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, home of Northwest, rose 
substantially following the merger. At St. Louis, in 
contrast, TWA's post-acquisition fares showed little 
change relative to the industry and remained near the 
national average. TWA's local fares, however, remained 
higher than its competitors (Borenstein, 1990). 
The failures and consolidations of the mid-1980's 
and evidence of localized market power at hub airports 
raised congressional ire and even short-lived calls for re- 
regulation (Morrison & Winston, 1990). Yet a decline in 
the number of large national carriers does not translate 
into greater concentration at the route level. In fact, the 
growth of the large hub-and-spoke networks provided for 
more competition in most longer markets which are 
serviced across several competing hubs. Brueckner, Dyer, 
and Spiller (1992) show that network growth reduces 
fares in city pair markets connected through the hub. 
EMERGING ISSUES 
Stability and equilibrium do not yet reign in the 
domestic airline industry. Despite the well-known risks of 
forecasting, several recent developments seem likely to 
shape the industry. 
Role of the Travel Agent 
Travel agents provide about 80 percent of airline 
reservation and ticket sales. At an average of 10 percent 
of ticket price, commissions provide an attractive target 
for cost savings. Last year most major carriers engaged in 
a direct assault by capping commissions at $50 per ticket. 
Subsequent defections leave the result in question. All 
carriers attempt to encourage direct bookings through 
owned sales offices, ticket by mail, and other marketing 
programs; nonetheless, most carriers support and 
encourage sales through the agency network. A few, 
however, attempt to bypass the agencies entirely. 
Southwest's flights are listed in the CRS's but agents 
must book flights directly with Southwest. Before its 
tragic crash, ValuJet supported its rapid growth primarily 
through direct marketing with little agency support. 
High information costs generated by thousands of 
constantly changing fares and restrictions as well as the 
requirement for a hard-copy ticket have, to this point, 
allowed the travel agency industry to dominate the retail 
market channels. This position is under attack by recent 
industry initiatives. Ticketless travel, first introduced by 
Morris Air (now acquired by Southwest), is spreading 
across the industry and receiving growing customer 
acceptance. Reno Air recently announced an agreement 
with Ticketmaster for sales in the Los Angeles basin. 
Ticketmaster will book directly into Reno Air's 
reservation system. Finally, direct passenger access to 
schedules, fares, and reservations through online services 
may represent the greatest threat to the travel agent as 
consumers invade the agents' previously exclusive domain 
(Ott, 1995; Underwood, 1995). 
The outcome of these changes is ambiguous. A 
restructuring of sales distribution with less travel agency 
involvement offers significant savings potential for major 
carriers, eroding some of the cost advantage of their 
smaller rivals. On the other hand, improvements in 
passenger access to schedules and fares would benefit 
smaller airlines. 
Low-Cost Carriers 
Southwest Airlines continues to expand its low-frills, 
low-fare service, most recently with service from existing 
markets in the Midwest and Northeast to Florida. 
Southwest's growth, customer acceptance, and consistent 
profitability have attracted the adulation, envy, and 
strategic attention of every segment of the industry. 
United's West Coast Shuttle represents the most 
significant effort to defend markets with service designed 
specifically to compete with Southwest. Carefully planned 
and well-financed, the Shuttle at first met with limited 
success, having to withdraw from some initial markets 
(McCartney & McCarthy, 1996). More recent reports 
show stronger traffic. Although the West Coast markets 
will remain intensely competitive, nothing on the horizon 
would seem to limit Southwest's ultimate expansion to 
the entire domestic market. 
The last few years also have witnessed a resurgence 
of low-cost, new-entrant carriers reminiscent of the 
immediate post-deregulation period. A recent 
Department of Transportation study concludes that 
consumers save some $4 billion annually from this 
renewed competition covering routes that account for 37 
percent of domestic passenger traffic (Gruley & 
McCartney, 1995). Frequent comparison with Southwest 
masks the diverse marketing strategies employed by these 
- - 
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newest entrants. Unlike Southwest, most operate hub- 
and-spoke systems. Leading examples include Reno Air, 
Midway, Western Pacific, and, before its June grounding, 
highly profitable, rapidly expanding Valdet. Reno Air 
and Midway operate on opposite coasts in markets 
abandoned by American. Each provides traditional full- 
service with CRS listing, reservations that include 
advanced seat assignment, and interline ticketing and 
baggage with other carriers. AirTran offers a different 
example with its low-frequency, low-fare service between 
smaller Midwest and Northeast markets to Orlando. In 
its Southeast and Florida routes, Air South, in contrast, 
attempted to replicate Southwest's linear, high-frequency, 
no-frills service. 
Encouraged by the success of Valdet's initial public 
stock offering, Frontier, Western Pacific, and Vanguard 
also have gone public, raising funds that ensure at least 
short-term survival. While the long-term prospects for 
Reno Air seem assured, most new carriers struggle. Air 
South, initially supported with ample initial public 
financing from South Carolina, failed to develop a 
profitable level of traffic. This spring, Air South changed 
to a "hub bypass" strategy by linking New York with mid- 
sized Southeast cities. Frontier largely abandoned its 
early emphasis of linking Denver to markets in the 
northern mountain and plains states and now 
concentrates on easthest markets across its Denver hub. 
MarkAir entered bankruptcy and ceased operation in the 
fall of 1995 (Alexander, 19%). The publicity following 
ValuJet's May crash and the FAA investigation that led 
to  its grounding on June 17 heightened concerns for the 
viability of the current wave of low-cost camers. 
No matter the outcome for individual new-entrant 
carriers, low-cost carriers promise to fulfill the 
predictions of deregulation proponents by providing low- 
fare air travel alternatives. As a result, major old-line 
carriers will face continuing pressure to lower costs, 
particularly in short-haul markets that connect to their 
hub cities. Routes once served by the major airlines but 
now entrusted to their commuter subsidiaries operating 
turboprop aircraft seem particularly vulnerable. The 
commuters have responded by adding pure jet aircraft to 
their inventory. On the other hand, American and Delta, 
following United's lead, are in discussions with their 
pilots aimed at forming effective, low-cost competitive 
service. Which carriers eventually succeed in serving these 
markets is an open question (Bender, 1995). 
In long-haul routes, the major carriers appear better 
positioned to compete. These markets are hardly immune 
to competition, however. Western Pacific, after less than 
a year in business, operates a coast-to-coast route system 
through its hub in Colorado Springs. Southwest has on 
order new 737 models well-suited for long, thin routes. 
And Pan American World Airways, perhaps the best 
known name in aviation history, has announced plans to 
resurrect itself as a low-cost carrier with non-stop, coast- 
to-coast domestic service. 
CONCLUSION 
For 40 years before 1978, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board protected the domestic airline industry from the 
vagaries of the free market, controlling entry and exit, 
awarding routes, and dictating price by formula. Prices 
remained uniform, simple, stable, and high. Rare 
corporate business failures resulted in CAB-sanctioned 
acquisition by a stronger airline. Unionized labor wages 
rose above comparable levels in other industries. 
Inefficiencies, particularly low-load factors, resulted from 
non-price competition in service frequency and inflight 
amenities. During the regulated era, the industry matured 
to replace rail as the predominant mode of public 
intercity transportation. 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 unleashed the 
full power of market forces and transformed many of the 
fundamental characteristics of the industry. Expansive 
hub-and-spoke delivery systems, complex pricing schemes, 
hub airport dominance by a single carrier, and brand 
loyalty-inducing devices did not exist in the regulated 
environment. Almost 20 years after the ADA, it would 
seem that all results should be fully known and, indeed, 
the vision of the proponents of deregulation has been 
largely vindicated. Consumers in general have benefited 
but not without great cost to many within the industry 
who endured the transition. Although the pace of change 
has slowed, evolution continues, shaped by yet another 
wave of new entrant carriers and by new information and 
marketing technology that promise to reduce the role of 
the travel agent.O 
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